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 Abstract 
The idea of Payments for environmental services (PES) has an appealing simplicity, which may explain the 
success  of  the  concept.  However,  successful  projects  are  far  limited  though  and  two  constraints  have  been 
identified in literature. The first is limited demand: too few service users are so confident about the mechanism 
that they are willing to pay. The second obstacle is poor knowledge on the institutional requirements entailing 
incentive and livelihood mechanisms which so far have received comparatively less attention. This paper focuses 
on both constraints by arguing that monitoring effectiveness and conditionality of PES schemes are crucial and 
that institutional arrangements for monitoring should be in place. By analysing in a systematic way what types of 
measurement problems there are, the paper shows that the type of monitoring that is required within a PES has 
consequences  for  the  institutional  arrangement  needed  for  a  successful  PES.  We  find  that  the  institutional 
arrangements  for  monitoring  vary  according  to  (i)  the  type  of  environmental  service  and  its  underlying 
production process, (ii) the extent to which the environmental service can be freely observed or measured, (iii) 
the extent to which activities of the resource managers who provide the environmental service can be freely 
observed, and finally (iv) the deterministic or stochastic nature of production processes. 
 
 




There is an increasing interest in Markets for Environmental Services (MES) as an approach 
to integrate economic growth, ecological integrity and poverty reduction goals (Hope et al. 
2005;  Landell-Mills  and  Porras  2002).  Most  come  down  to  payments  for  environmental 
services (PES) where the ‘demand side’ is often the government (Kumar 2005). Because 
environmental services have a public good nature, governments have usually taken up the 
responsibility of maintaining them. Many PES schemes are funded by development agencies 
or  rural  development  programs,  reflecting  a  combined  goal  of  poverty  alleviation  and 
conservation of environmental services. However, recent research has shown that the poverty 
impact of PES is often mixed at best and may benefit the wealthier who have more natural 
assets (e.g. large landowners) (Landell-Mills 2002; Hope et al. 2005; Zilberman et al. 2006; 
Pagiola 2005; Zbinden 2005; Grieg-Gran et al. 2005).  
 
The idea of PES has an appealing simplicity, which may also account for its success in recent 
years.  Proposals  to  apply  PES  for  various  goals  abound.  Successful  implemented  PES 
schemes are far fewer though. Wunder (2005) identifies two key obstacles. The first obstacle 
is limited demand: too few service users are so confident about the mechanism that they are 
willing  to  pay  —  in  some  cases,  because  the  link  between  land  use  and  environmental 
services (ES) provision is insufficiently understood or ambiguous. The second obstacle is 
poor  knowledge  on  the  institutional  requirements  entailing  incentive  and  livelihood 
mechanisms which so far have received comparatively less attention. 
 
Wunder (2005:3) defines a PES as: “a voluntary transaction where a well-defined ES (or a 
land-use likely to secure that service) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer from a 
(minimum  one)  ES  provider  if  and  only  if  the  ES  provider  secures  ES  provision 
(conditionality)”. The last requirement on conditionality is the focus of our paper. It is an 
extremely important one because it ties in with the first obstacle mentioned by Wunder. As 
Pagiola  and  Platais  (2005)  state:  “If  services  aren’t  delivered,  people  won’t  pay”. 
Demonstrating that ES are provided entails establishing a biophysical link between land uses 
and ES outcomes and developing suitable methods for measuring and monitoring provision   2
of the service. The lack of information to link changes in practices to increased provision of 
environmental services remains the “Achilles heel” for most PES programs (Pagiola et al. 
2002). 
 
It seems that poverty considerations may lead to disregarding this conditionality: “(…) most 
implementers seem to shy away from the business-like feature of only paying the providers if 
they  actually  deliver  the  agreed-upon  service.  In  general,  they  are  too  concerned  about 
disrupting their relationship with poor rural farmers to withhold payment.” (Wunder 2006), 
see also (Scherr et al. 2006; Wunder et al. 2005; Hartmann 2004). Ironically, the concern of 
the  implementers  (mostly  governments  or  donor  agencies)  with  poor  rural  farmers  and 
ignoring the effectiveness of PES programs may compromise the long-term success of PES, 
jeopardizing the potential benefits of PES for these farmers. 
 
Another important reason why many PES schemes have poor monitoring schemes is that it is 
often difficult to measure environmental services and to establish a cause-effect relationship 
between land use and the services (FAO 2004). Relationships among management practices 
on  specific  farmers,  effects  on  environmental  services,  and  benefits  derived  from  these 
services are often complex and not completely understood (Claassen and Horan 2000; Kleijn 
2006). Clear and measurable indicators for the environmental services are often assumed. 
However, these are often lacking as well as a clear link between the agricultural practices and 
their effect: “most of Europe's agri-environment schemes have very vague goals, such as to 
"prevent damage to the environment" or "provide wildlife habitats". Specific targets are not 
set; progress is rarely monitored; the baselines from which they start are not defined. The 
good that they do is thus hard to measure, which in some eyes makes the schemes hard to 
justify” (Whitfield 2006:908). When a study evaluated these agri-environmental schemes and 
found them to be less effective than assumed (Kleijn et al. 2001), this led to a storm of 
discussion and possibly to reduced funding for such schemes (Whitfield 2006). In a follow-
up project on evaluation of agri-environmental schemes, one of the conclusions was that 
“insights into cause and effect are important for the design/re-design process, for which 
monitoring  and  clarity  of  objectives  are  key.”  (EASY-project  2006).  Finally,  Rousseau 
(2007)  concludes  that  it  is  pointless  to  develop  conservation  policies  if  they  are  not 
complemented with a monitoring and enforcement strategy and that incomplete enforcement   3
has great significance in the government’s choice of instrument with which the conservation 
goal is to be achieved. 
 
This paper analyses the question that if monitoring is indeed necessary for an effective PES 
scheme but at the same time involves (high) transaction costs, how should monitoring be 
organised to minimize these transaction costs? It does so by systematically analysing the 
types of measurement problems that exist, making use of the literature that has appeared in 
the relevant fields. The paper concludes with a summary of the findings and some hypotheses 
for future empirical work on monitoring issues.   
 
The role of monitoring in PES 
 
In general, a PES scheme includes certain economic agents (resource managers or farmers) 
who manage resources that provide a positive environmental externality, or environmental 
service. This environmental service benefits another group of people, which can be a specific 
group  of  people  or  society  as  a  whole.  These  beneficiaries  can  be  labelled  the  ‘service 
demand  side’  or  ‘buyers’.  For  simplicity  and  following  principal-agent  theory,  we  will 
hereafter  call  the  service  providers  ‘agents’  and  the  service  demand  side  the  ‘principal’, 
except in cases where we want to describe the type of agent or principal. In many cases the 
government, representing the interests of the beneficiaries, acts as the principal. We therefore 
assume there is only one principal and refrain from cases where there are multiple principals 
entering into contract with one or more agents. We also assume that agents face the same 
opportunity  costs  and  are  symmetric  in  their  influence  over  the  production  of  the 
environmental service, although we will relax that restriction at the end
1. The agents and 
principal agree on a contract which specifies the actions that the agents should undertake and 
the  payments  terms.  The  principal  expects  the  actions  of  the  agent  to  lead  to  certain 
environmental services, for which she is prepared to pay. The payments cover at least the 
opportunity  costs  of  the  actions  implemented  by  the  agent,  satisfying  the  participation 
constraint. Transaction costs play an important role in PES schemes. Transaction costs are 
                                                   
1 I therefore do not investigate adverse selection, although this is an important issue in PES (Ferraro, 2005). More 
attention has been given to adverse selection problems in agri-environmental schemes, compared to moral hazard 
problems (Ozanne et al., 2001). Adverse selection with fixed and variable costs in PES is taken up in Arguedas, 
Meijerink, and van Soest (2007).   4
often under-estimated and may undermine the viability of a PES scheme (Landell-Mills and 
Porras 2002). Therefore the set-up of any PES scheme must aim to reduce transaction costs. 
This  can  be  achieved  by  choosing  the  most  appropriate  institutional  set-up  (Eggertsson 
2005).  
 
Payments are conditional on services provided. In some PES schemes, payments are made to 
communities in the form of community social support, such as building a road, giving access 
rights or any other royalties, or building a new school or health centre (Noordwijk et al., 
2004, Rosa et al., 2003). However, this undermines the conditionality of payments, as these 
cannot  be  taken  away  when  environmental  services  are  not  supplied.  We  will  therefore 
assume that payments are made contingent and that non-compliance leads to reduction or 
discontinuance of  payments. Finally,  information gathered  from  monitoring serves  as the 
basis for enforcement. 
 
Although there is a wide range of economic literature on enforcement (see Polinsky and 
Shavell 2000 for an overview), monitoring and enforcement have often been ignored by both 
academics  and  policy-makers  when  discussing  environmental  policy  alternatives  (Cohen 
1999).  In  the  economic  literature  on  enforcement,  the  principal’s  problem  is  to  choose 
enforcement expenditures (or equivalently probability of detection through monitoring), the 
level of fine, the standard for imposing liability and, if relevant, the imprisonment term. 
Because there is a trade-off between the level of fine and enforcement expenditures, the 
principal  can  reduce  monitoring  costs  by  imposing  high  fines  (Becker  1968).  In  PES 
schemes, the voluntary nature limits the range of punishment mechanisms. Either they do not 
exist at all (see Wunder et al. 2005), or they are limited either to decreasing payments or to 
ending the contract completely. In agri-environmental schemes in Europe and the US, the 
possibility of a fine is often included (Ozanne et al. 2001), but because many PES schemes in 
developing countries aim to enhance rural development and reduce poverty, imposing a fine 
on  poor  resource  managers  in  addition  to  withholding  payments  might  be  considered 
inappropriate. Thus, in most PES schemes there is no additional fine and the “punishment” 
consists of reducing payments, which is of a limited range. This can be modelled as limited 
liability. Given that there is a trade-off between the level of fine and level of enforcement or 
required monitoring this implies that monitoring and enforcement expenditures cannot be 
decreased much.   5
 
Three main environmental services can be distinguished (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002)
2, 
these categories are also used by Rohjan and Engel (2005): 
￿  Biodiversity conservation 
￿  Carbon offset 
￿  Watershed protection 
Rohjan and Engel (ibid) categorise these according to production technology. We will do the 
same but in a slightly different manner. Our criteria are two-fold and linked to monitoring of 
input (activities implemented by the agents) and outcome (the environmental service). The 
first criterion is thus at the level of the activities where we make a distinction between those 
services whereby the individual activities can be measured independently and those whereby 
the activities influence each other, i.e. the activities of one agent affects the activities or 
outcome  of  another  agent.  The  second  criterion  is  at  the  level  of  the  outcome  where  a 
distinction is made between those services that can be attributed to an individual agent and 
can  thus  be  monitored  per  agent,  and  those  services  that  are  pooled  or  joint.  This 
classification is illustrated in figure 1. Following Rohjan and Engel (2005), we characterise 
environmental services that can be supplied through an independent, an additive or a joint 
multiplicative  production  function.  One  square  (bottom  left)  is  left  empty  because  it  is 
technically not possible that a production function is characterised by interdependence but its 
outcome is not. 
 
                                                   
2 Landell-Mills and Porras (ibid) also identify landscape beauty, but we will disregard this service for simplicity, 
as it is often combined with biodiversity protection.   6
Figure 1: classification of environmental services according to measurement of input or 
outcome 
Outcome: environmental service   
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A third dimension is added in the figure and that is whether the link between input and 
outcome is deterministic, which means that the outcome is completely determined by the 
activities  implemented by  the  agent,  or  whether  it  is  stochastic,  and  that  the  outcome  is 
influenced by natural processes, such as climate. Most environmental services are more or 
less influenced by natural processes, and thus the agent has no complete control over the 
outcome. Generally, in a market, buyers of a good or service pay for the good or service 
itself, and do not care how much effort was put into the production
3. When you buy bread 
from the baker you are not interested in how much effort the baker put into it, you care about 
the bread you buy. Similarly, buyers of environmental services presumably therefore care 
only about the outcome of the production process, and not about the activities the resource 
managers have put into this. Thus, buyers on the environmental services markets would pay a 
certain price for each tonne of carbon offset, cubic metre of water supplied downstream, 
tonne of sedimentation reduced, number of rare species protected. This would suggest that 
monitoring would only need to be done at the outcome level. But this is only possible when 
the production process of environmental services is almost completely deterministic and the 
cause-effect relation between input and outcome is clear. Because it is not, monitoring is 
necessary of the activities implemented by the agents. 
 
                                                   
3 Although increasingly, consumers care about the production process: whether it was environmentally friendly, 
or socially acceptable for instance.    7
The  stochastic  nature  of  the  provision  of  environmental  services  thus  includes  a  certain 
amount of risk. It is possible that certain activities have been implemented (at a certain cost), 
but that natural processes reduce the outcome. For instance, resource owners are paid to 
conserve a forest, but this forest is burnt by natural forest fires. In some cases, climatic 
conditions render the activities implemented by the agents ineffective. To illustrate this case, 
farmers are paid to implement soil and water conservation to reduce soil erosion but in a year 
with little rainfall there is little erosion anyway and the effectiveness of these structures is 
negligible. These effects are to some extent measurable – it is easy to verify whether there 
has been a fire, or the amount of rainfall. But in other cases the exact link between activities 
implemented by the agents and the resulting environmental service is not clear because the 
natural processes are not well understood.  
 
The  stochastic  nature  of  the  production  of  environmental  services  means  that  there  is  a 
production  risk.  Who  should  bear  this  risk,  the  agents  or  the  principal  depends  on  the 
contract. Especially when the agents are poor and are vulnerable to financial insecurity, the 
balance should be carefully considered. Rojahn and Engel (2005) discuss the role of risk 
through environmental processes in optimal incentive contracts (see also Ozanne et al. 2001; 
Fraser 2002). They observe that the general structure of PES contracts should be a two-part 
linear  payment.  The  two  parts  of  the  payment  scheme  are  a  fixed  compensation  and  a 
variable payment based on the produced amount of the environmental service. They serve to 
balance risk and reward. In general, risk and risk aversion on the part of the agent increase 
the risk premium of the agent and in that way their cost of supplying the environmental 
service. We will not discuss the role of risk further, although we acknowledge that risk and 
risk aversion are important aspects in designing PES contracts. 
 
Independent production function 
An example of an independent production function is tree planting to provide the service 
carbon offsetting. The activities of the resource managers planting the trees can be easily 
observed. The outcome, reduced carbon in the air, cannot be observed easily, but the link 
between the number of trees and the amount of carbon offset is clear and can be measured 
easily, thus we can safely interpret this as the outcome being easy to measure.  
   8
In the most simple case, three criteria are satisfied: (i) the production function is independent, 
(i) the link between input and outcome is clear and (iii) input and outcome are measurable, 
and a simple institutional arrangement will probably do. A contract or agreement will specify 
certain (measurable) targets that need to be met, which can then be verified by the principal 
with negligible transaction costs. PES schemes are often portrayed in these terms, but this 
simple case is rare in reality. Even in situations such as tree planting, the principal must make 
some costs to verify input or outcome. Especially in a PES scheme in which many agents 
participate, the sum of all monitoring costs can be substantial, let alone the enforcement 
costs. Monitoring costs can be reduced by using techniques such as remote sensing, which 
will cover many agents. The number of trees planted and amount of carbon sequestration can 
be monitored by for instance remote sensing techniques (Vincent and Saatchi 1999), which 
will reduce monitoring costs per tree planted. Another approach can be to work with groups 
of agents, where the agents monitor each other and the principal monitors the group, and 
holds  the  group  accountable  for  the  input  and  outcome.  Ghate  and  Nagendra  (2005)  for 
instance  examine  the  impact  of  the  institutional  structure  on  monitoring  and  on  the 
effectiveness of forest management in India. They find that local enforcement (i.e. by the 
agents  themselves)  has  been  most  effective  in  the  case  where  forest  management  was 
initiated by the communities. However, this approach brings about potential problems of 
free-riding within a group, and specific solutions must be found for this problem. We will 
discuss group monitoring below under additive production function. 
 
When outcome can be observed easily, but input cannot, there is a moral hazard situation. In 
general, in principal-agent models with moral hazard, if the principal observes the outcome 
but not the action, she can design a payment rule for the agent, based on the outcome, that 
provides the latter with appropriate incentives to act (Singh 1985; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-
Castrillo 2001; Laffont and Martimort 2002). Monitoring is therefore often excluded from 
principal-agent models. However, Grossman and Hart (1983) in their seminal paper on moral 
hazard, acknowledge that the assumption that the principal cannot monitor the agent's actions 
at  all  may  in  some  cases  be  rather  extreme.  In  such  cases,  imperfect  monitoring  of  the 
activities or effort of agents plays a role.  
 
In the case of independent production, it is not often the case that the input activities of 
agents can be observed but outcome cannot. Due to the character of independent production,   9
the outcome arises at the same locality as where the input measures are implemented and is 
therefore usually observable.  
 
Additive production function 
An additive production function resembles the independent production function in that each 
agent contributes to the environmental function independently. But with additive production, 
the  combined  effort  of  several  agents  produces  a  joint  outcome.  For  instance,  if  several 
farmers  reduce  pumping  of  groundwater,  the  overall  water  level  will  rise,  which  can  be 
measured. We assume here that the contribution of each agent is symmetric and additive. 
Thus if the outcome is lower than expected or specified in a contract, the principal knows that 
one or more agents have not contributed. The principal can only find out who by inspecting 
each agent. If the group of farmers is large, then the costs of inspecting each agent will rise 
accordingly. 
 
This seems to be another moral hazard problem for which the solution is a contract that 
entails the right incentives to overcome this problem. But the common assumption in moral 
hazard is that outcome is freely observable and sufficiently informative about the agent’s 
effort to warrant using it for contracting, which in the case of additive production is not 
tenable. In the above case, for instance, the outcome (overall water level) is not sufficiently 
informative  about  the  individual  agent’s  effort.  In  this  case,  some  form  of  monitoring 
becomes necessary (Singh 1985; Baiman and Rajan 1994). The question now is how the 
principal should monitor the contribution of the agents. In an additive production function, it 
is possible to monitor the individual activities of the agents and the joint outcome, be it at a 
cost. There are two alternatives. The first is that the principal inspects all agents to determine 
who is shirking, and the second is that the principal contracts a group of agents and leaves it 
to the group of agents to monitor each other. We assume here that the activities of the agents 
can be observed, be it with (varying) cost.  
 
In the first case, inspection games can be applied to analyse the strategies of the players and 
establish  optimal  monitoring  (Fudenberg  and  Tirole  1991).  Inspection  games  have  been 
applied to various problems, including environmental regulation (Avenhaus et al. 2002) and 
various institutional arrangements, such as including an auditor can be modelled (Rasmusen   10
2007; Dittmann 1999).  Inspection games often lead to mixed strategies, which are not as 
intuitive as pure strategies because people do not take random actions. But a mixed strategy 
here can be interpreted as a principal and a number of agents, where the principal selects at 
random an agent to monitor, with a certain probability. Vice versa, each of the agents chooses 
to shirk some x percent of the time, and cooperate 100 – x percent of the time. 
 
In  the  second  case  of  group  contracting,  the  principal  can  reduce  monitoring  costs  and 
transfer these costs to the agents. This is appropriate when monitoring costs are high for the 
principal but lower for agents. One could think of agents who are neighbours and who can 
easily observe each other’s activities. The principal can then choose to inspect the group, 
which brings us back to the above situation, where the group can be considered as one agent. 
Establishing  a  contract  with  a  group  of  agents  has  a  fundamental  difference  with  the 
principal-agent relationship and that is that group relationships entail the problem of free-
riding since the effect of a reduction on effort (e.g. the principal punishes the whole group) is 
shared  by  all  agents  (Macho-Stadler  and  Pérez-Castrillo  2001).  This  problem  can  be 
modelled  as  a  non-cooperative  game,  whereby  the  players  choose  between  the  strategy 
“cooperate” and put in the required effort levels, or “shirk” and free-ride on the other agents. 
There are two conditions that enable an agent to free-ride: first, the principal cannot detect 
who is free-riding and second, the principal pays the group of agents according to outcome 
and this is shared equally between group members
4. 
 
Enforcement  mechanisms  do  not  need  to  take  the  form  of  punishment  in  the  form  of 
imposing a fine. There are various reasons why people will cooperate. This can be morality 
(people do what is morally right regardless of what other do), altruism (people are willing 
selflessly to contribute to a public goal), or inequality aversion (people feel guilty when they 
disadvantage  others).  However,  Barron  and  Gjerde  (1997)  find  that  what  they  call  ‘peer 
pressure’ does not always have a positive outcome when agents engaged in group production 
can detect and punish shirking (see also Kandel and Lazear 1992; Huck et al. 2002 on peer 
pressure). They describe for instance that there may be a conflict between the principal and 
                                                   
4 It is interesting that in social psychology literature, various other motivational reasons for shirking (‘social 
loafing’) have been found, such as the lack of identification of individual contributions in a group effort, 
difficulty to establish a relationship between input and output, and a minimum of evaluation potential 
(Vermeulen and Benders 2003). This suggests that measurement difficulties and the complexity of input-
outcome relations in PES actually contribute to shirking in groups!   11
the agents as to the optimal norm or sanction. The potential punishment agent 1 imposes on 
agent 2 benefits 1 if it induces greater effort by 2. But agent 1, unlike the principal, may not 
take  into  account  the  cost  of  such  punishment  in  terms  of  deterioration  on  the  work 
environment or psychological cost (such as guilt) for agent 2. 
 
Several authors have analysed the role that punishment, trust and reciprocity play within 
game theory (Carpenter et al. 2004; Cox 2004; Engle-Warnick and Slonim 2003; Brosig 
2002;  Gintis  2000)  and  in  common  pool  resource  settings  (Castillo  and  Saysel  2005; 
Cárdenas and Ostrom 2004). Repeated cooperation leads to players acquiring a reputation of 
being cooperative. This leads to trust, other players expect a player with a reputation of being 
cooperative to be cooperative also in the future. They then feel confident to reciprocate and 
also cooperate. The more repeatedly cooperative behaviour is displayed, the higher levels of 
trust are attained. However, if players defect and obtain a reputation for being cheats, other 
players lose trust in them and will no longer be willing to cooperate. The more often a player 
cheats, the less cooperation will be achieved.  
 
Joint multiplicative production function 
A  joint  multiplicative  production  function  is  characterised  by  the  interdependence  of 
production functions of different agents. Besides the fact that natural processes play a role, 
the  activities  of  the  agents  influence  each  other.  Their  combined  activities,  no  longer 
independent, lead to a joint outcome. For instance, the effect of the activities implemented in 
a  certain  field  under  an  agri-environmental  scheme  that  aims  at  improving  biodiversity 
(plants,  birds  etc)  depends  very  much  on  what  happens  in  neighbouring  fields.  The 
implementation of agri-environmental schemes on a small number of interspersed fields, as 
compared  to  a  scattered  distribution  of  isolated  fields,  can  improve  the  effectiveness  of 
conservation  measures  by  providing  stepping  stones  for  species  dispersal  (Kleijn  2006). 
Parkhurst  et  al.  (2002)  explored  the  possibility  of  achieving  adjoining  fields  through  an 
agglomeration bonus. 
 
Another way of achieving this is by offering group contracts. If it is not just a matter of 
joining fields but if specific activities of adjoining agents influence each other, it makes sense   12
to contract a group
5 so that agents can coordinate activities. However, this type of group will 
be slightly different than we discussed in the previous sections and has been labelled team 
production.  Alchian  and  Demzetz    (1972  p.  779)  were  the  first  ones  to  describe  team 
production: “With team production it is difficult, solely by observing total output, to either 
define or determine each individual's contribution to this output of the cooperating inputs. 
The output is yielded by a team, by definition, and it is not a sum of separable outputs of each 
of its members.” Alchian and Demsetz thus make a distinct separation between additive and 
joint multiplicative production functions. After the seminal paper of Alchian and Demsetz, 
team  production  has  been  analysed  by  several  authors  (specifically  Holmström  1982; 
McAfee and McMillan 1991) and has been applied to many different settings. 
 
If we take the strict definition of team production and assume that it is not possible to observe 
the cooperation (i.e. marginal productivity) of team members, neither the principal nor the 
agents can enforce cooperation based on monitoring individual input. This again runs the risk 
of becoming a prisoners’ dilemma in which the Nash equilibrium is shirking by all players. 
Holmström (1982) has shown that under certainty
6, team incentives alone can remove the 
free-rider problem. Such incentives require penalties that waste output or bonuses that exceed 
output. The principal either enforces penalties or offers bonuses. This role is what Holmström 
calls the ‘breaking the budget-balancing constraint’. The free-rider problem is not only the 
consequence of the inability to observe actions, but equally the consequence of imposing 
budget-balancing.  Breaking  the  budget  constraint  will  permit  team  penalties  that  are 
sufficient to police all agents’ behaviour.  
 
Although the role of the principal as a budget-breaker is certainly a solution to the free-rider 
problem in the case where agents’ activities cannot be monitored, Rojahn and Engel (2005) 
point out that this type of collective punishment has several disadvantages. Most importantly, 
it might be perceived as unfair because it may lead to a situation where complying agents are 
forced to make up for their free-riding agents to avoid punishment. Bowles (2004) adds to 
this that when there are significant stochastic influences on the level of performance of the 
                                                   
5 In the Netherlands, farmers have organised themselves into such groups. The European Union has recently 
allowed that farmers can participate in groups in agri-environmental schemes (IPO, 2006. Nederlandse 
Catalogus Groenblauwe diensten 2007.) 
6 Although group incentives can also work under uncertainty, their effectiveness will be limited if there are many 
resource managers and if the resource managers are risk-averse. In this case, the need for monitoring arises.   13
team, which is very possible in PES schemes, Holmström’s solution becomes unfeasible. 
However, it is difficult to find an alternative solution to the case where shirking cannot be 
detected and this is why Holmström’s contribution is so important. 
 
A more fundamental point of criticism is that Holmström’s model assumes that the principal 
and the agents have conflicting interests. However, one could assume that agents will not 
enter into a voluntary PES contract under a team production scheme when they do not agree 
with the goals the principal has set. This will be true for some PES settings, especially when 
PES contracts only pay the opportunity costs such as in many agri-environmental schemes in 
Europe. Changing the conflicting goals assumption changes the uncooperative situation to a 
cooperative model. More recent literature analysed moral hazard with several agents under a 
cooperative  model  (see  Che  and  Yoo  2001  for  an  overview;  Macho-Stadler  and  Perez-
Castrillo 1993). Cooperation between agents depends on amongst others, whether there exists 
a group culture or cohesion within a team. This can be achieved by the incentive scheme. 
According to Harkins et al. (1980; cited in Vermeulen and Benders 2003) rewarding and 
punishing agents should be based on group outcomes because the individual efforts are not 
visible.  Group  rewards  are  seen  as  an  important  determinant  for  cohesion,  as  collective 
rewards increase the ‘group feeling’. Case studies in the area of the provision of water-related 
services by farmers in The Netherlands have demonstrated that interactive learning processes 
among area-based stakeholders can function as an effective governance mechanism in the 
water sector (SLIM 2004a; 2004b). 
 
The last case we will shortly discuss here is when joint output is costly to observe and input 
may  also  be  costly  to  observe.  We  have  not  found  many  models  that  incorporate  these 
restrictions.  Gautier  (1999)  developed  a  model  in  which  the  agents  and  principal  invest 
together  to  develop  a  product  (in  our  case  a  certain  environmental  service).  Agents  are 
responsible for the production of the service, and the principal invests in monitoring. The 
level of effort by the agents is private information to each agent. The efforts determine, 
together with a random shock, the output’s value. This value remains unknown until the 
product is brought on the market. There is thus a time lag between input and outcome. For 
PES this may be a relevant model, as the outcome of activities implemented by resource 
managers often only appear after a certain period (in the case of watershed services appearing 
downstream, or number of birds after the breeding season) and are influenced by natural   14
processes (which may take the form of a random shock). In the model, the principal can 
observe a signal about the output’s quality. The accuracy of the signal is affected by the 
principal’s monitoring decision. Without monitoring, the signals are noisy. By investing in 
monitoring, the principal can observe perfectly informative signals. For PES this may be 
interpreted  as  follows.  The  principal  may  observe  some  signal  about  the  environmental 
service  delivered  without  making  too  many  costs.  However,  in  order  to  measure  the 
environmental service precisely, the principal must invest in a costly measurement exercise: 
an extensive survey of agro-biodiversity in an area, or quantity of water downstream.  
 
Conclusions and discussion 
 
Because the idea of PES is so appealing, many PES projects are being implemented around 
the world. The appeal of PES is enhanced by the fact it can provide poor resource managers 
an additional income source, thus combining environmental and poverty reduction goals. It 
seems that because the concept of PES is widely accepted, the need is felt less to actually 
show the effectiveness of PES projects and measure the environmental services provided, or 
monitor  the  activities  implemented  by  the  resource  managers.  However,  showing  the 
effectiveness of PES is crucial to its long-term success, especially when the private sector is 
going to buy into the concept and pay for the environmental services they benefit from. 
 
The specific nature of environmental services makes monitoring a multifaceted issue. The 
institutional set-up of a PES scheme depends on (i) the type of environmental service and its 
underlying production process,  (ii)  the extent  to which the  environmental  service can  be 
freely observed or measured, (iii) the extent to which activities of the resource managers who 
provide the environmental service can be freely observed, and finally (iv) the deterministic or 
stochastic nature of production processes, or put differently, the extent that natural processes 
determine the environmental service. Transaction costs arise when costs must be made to 
measure the activities of resource managers and the environmental services. If these are high, 
implementing a PES scheme may become infeasible. The institutional arrangements must 
therefore  be  such  that  they  reduce  transaction  costs  and  maximise  pay-offs  to  resource 
managers and the principal. This may be achieved by providing different types of incentives, 
which include payment arrangements and punishments, and different monitoring systems. 
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We have distinguished three different types of environmental service production processes 
(following Rojahn and Engel 2005): independent, additive and joint multiplicative. We have 
shown that there are different monitoring issues for the three production processes. The role 
of monitoring has been paid relatively little attention, and to our knowledge, the different 
types of institutional arrangements for monitoring that fit different types of PES schemes and 
related transaction costs have been often ignored. This paper is a first attempt to shed some 
light  on  this  issue,  but  more  (empirical)  work  needs  to  be  done  to  develop  institutional 
arrangements that on the one hand reduce transaction costs of monitoring and on the other 
hand show the effectiveness of the PES scheme. This paper has put forward the hypothesis 
that in case of an independent production function, monitoring can be done on the basis of 
individual  contracts.  Depending  on  the  ease  with  which  environmental  services  can  be 
monitored,  different  monitoring  tools  can  be  implemented  (e.g.  from  remote  sensing  to 
individual visits). In the case of an additive production function, monitoring can be done on 
the basis of a group contract. Different arrangements for monitoring the group and avoiding 
free-riding behaviour, are possible depending on the type of group. But monitoring is based 
on  joint  output  and  individual  activities  (input).  For  a  joint  multiplicative  production 
function, monitoring should be based on a group contract and based on joint output only.  
 
Empirical  work  should  test  whether  these  options  are  (a)  indeed  the  most  effective  (i.e. 
workable  and  acceptable  to  agents)  and  (b)  the  most  efficient  (i.e.  minimise  transaction 
costs). As a follow-up to this theoretical work, it is envisaged to test these options in the field. 
This  will  be  done  in  the  framework  of  the  “Green  Water  Credits”  project  that  will  be 
implemented in Kenya in 2008. In this project, farmers will be monitored for ‘green water 
services’ they supply by implementing soil and water conservation practices in their fields.  
These ‘green water services’ entail increasing the soil moisture content, and by doing so 
increase groundwater levels and reduce soil run-off. The beneficiaries of these services are 
multiple, but the main group are the electricity companies that use hydro-electrical dams. 
These dams need a regular flow of (ground)water and a reduced soil run-off that siltates the 
dams and damages the turbines. This is an example of an additive production function. Three 
monitoring arrangements will be tested. The first will entail group contracts (e.g. per village) 
where the group will monitor each of the members. If certain farmers of the group are found 
to be skirting (by field visits), this will have consequences for the group as a whole (in terms 
of payment). The second will also entail group contracts, but monitoring will be done through   16
remote sensing instead of field visits to reduce transaction costs. However, it might be more 
difficult to pinpoint individual farmers and again a group will be held accountable for any 
skirting detected. The third will be individual contracts and individual monitoring. This paper 
asserts  that  this  last  option  is  difficult  to  implement  because  output  (i.e.  increased 
groundwater  flow  and  reduced  run-off)  is  extremely  difficult  and  costly  to  measure  per 
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